Special Topics in Cryptography

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Last time

• Public-key encryption and key-agreement

• Diffie Hellman (key agreement protocol)

Today

- RSA public key encryption
- Digital signatures

Public Key Encryption

• Secure communication even without shared secret keys!

Recalling Public Key Encryption

- Key generation: $Gen(1^n) \rightarrow (ek, dk)$ Encryption: $Enc(ek, m) \rightarrow c$
- Decryption: Dec(dk, c) = m'
- Completeness: decrypting correction m = m'
- Security: same as CPA security for private-key, but the adversary does not need any encryption oracle: it has the encryption key itself!

Recalling Key Agreement

- Interactive protocol between randomized Alice and Bob
- The sequence of messages $T = (t_1, t_2, ..., t_m)$ is called "transcript"
- At the end, Alice and Bob output key k_A , k_B

- Completeness: getting same keys $k_A = k_b = key$
- Security: suppose |key| = n, then (*T*, *key*) is computationally indistinguishable from (*T*, *U_n*) Namely, even if *T* is known, *key* is indistinguishable from uniform *U_n*

Diffie Hellman Key Agreement $\begin{cases} g', g', -g'' \\ 2, 2, 3 - g'' \\ 2, 2, 3 - g'' \end{cases}$

- Public parameters: large prime q a (multiplicative) generator g for Z_q
- 1. Alice picks $x \leftarrow \{1, \dots, q-1\}$ and Bob picks $y \leftarrow \{1, \dots, q-1\}$ at random
- 2. Alice sends $a = g^x$ to Bob and Bob sends $b = g^y$ to Alice.
- 3. Alice takes $b^x = g^{xy} = k$ and Bob takes $a^y = g^{xy} = k$ as the key.
- To implement in **efficiently**, we use "fast exponentiation" algorithm that computes $a^{y} \mod q$ in time **polynomial in lengths** of q, y, a $(\neg = (\beta, g))_{2} \ker (\beta, g) \longrightarrow ((\beta, g))_{2} \ker (\beta, g))_{3} \ker (\beta, g)$

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RSA Public-Key Encryption

Nain Idea of RSA: Trapdoor Permutations

- Intuition: Permutation $\pi : \{0, \dots, N-1\} \rightarrow \{0, \dots, N-1\}$ N is a bijection
 - 1. Easy to compute π publically
 - Easy to "invert" π only if have the trapdoor. 2.

• Key generation find: $ek = \pi$ and $dk = \sigma$ for permutations π, σ such that π 1. for all $x \in \{0, ..., N-1\}$: $\sigma(\pi(x)) = x$ namely $\sigma(\cdot) = \pi^{-1}(\cdot)$ 2. Given $\pi(x)$ it is "hard" to invert it to find x. Formally, for all poly-time A $\Pr_{\substack{x \in \{0, \dots N-1\}}} \left[A\left(\overset{\mathsf{n}(\cdot)}{\pi(x)} \right) = x \right] \le \operatorname{negl}(n) \qquad \text{where } n \approx \log(N) \text{ is sec parameter}$ D(x) **ч(x)** 3 implicit: if A also has description of of then invertig T2(2)=y back to 2 is easy just (upte 6(y)=x What is useful intuitively? Why cannot we use it naively?

Number Theory 101- (continued) $g_{cd}(N,M)$ ³: <u>relatively pine</u> , pq • gcd(N,M) = greatest common divisor of <math>M, N1pg Pr 1,2, p 2/2^{3/}, Pq • $\varphi(N) = |\{i \mid 1 \le i \le N, \gcd(N, i) = 1\}|$ $Pq - q - P + 1 = (P - 1)(q_1)$ • $\varphi(p)$ for prime p ? p $p_{=2} q_{=3}$ • $\varphi(pq)$ for primes p, q? $(P-1) \times (q-1)$ (P-1)(9-1)s 1×2=2 9(6)=[1,57]=2 • Euler's theorem: if $gcd(a, N) = 1 \rightarrow a^{\varphi(N)} = 1 \pmod{N}$

RSA Trapdoor Permutation $\begin{cases} & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & & \\$

• If $e \cdot d = 1 + k \cdot \varphi(N)$ which is the same as $e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$ then $a \in d = a \pmod{\varphi(N)}$ which means $\pi(x) = x^e$ is inverse of $\sigma(y) = y^d$ for gcd(x, N) = 1

 $\xrightarrow{} \text{Interestingly } \sigma(\pi(x)) = x \text{ even for } gcd(x, N) \neq 1$ $RSA : \qquad N = P \times 4 \quad Prime \quad P_{F} \neq 4$

How to use RSA Trapdoor Permutation for public-key encryption?

- Intuition: Permutation $\pi : \{0, \dots N 1\} \rightarrow \{0, \dots N 1\}$
 - 1. Easy to compute π publically
 - Easy to "invert" π only if have the trapdoor. 2.

One "correct" way to use RSA trapdoor permutation for public key encryption $\frac{r_{e}(r_{1}, -r_{n})}{s_{e}(s_{1}, -r_{n})}$ • Actual Randomized (CPA secure) Encryption of a big b Pick $r, s \in \{0, ..., N - 1\}$ at random and output $[\pi(r), s, \langle r, s \rangle \oplus b]$ Goldreich-Levis Thm: : r; . S; if (TI,) is a one way Permutation - o all polytme A. $P_{I}\left[A\left(S_{2}, t_{C}r\right)\right] = \langle r_{J}s \rangle \left[S_{2}^{\frac{1}{2}} + n_{2}r_{J}\right]$

Bellane Regimer. More efficient way, using an "ideal" hash function

- Let $h: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ be an "idea" hash function Key gen: generate a pair $ek = g(\cdot), dk = g^{-1}(\cdot)$ Encryption of $m \in \{0,1\}^n$.

 - Encryption of $m \in \{0,1\}^n$: pick $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$, output $c = g(r), h(r) \oplus m$ Decryption of c = (y,z): output $m \Rightarrow g^{-1}(y) \oplus z$

 - Even possible to do it efficiently in a CCA secure way using ideal hashing

We need prime numbers for RSA and DH !

• We need large prime numbers!

Public Key Authentication: Digital Signatures

Secure authentication without shared secret keys!



Defining Digital Signatures

- Alice has a signing key sk and a verification key vk
- Using <u>sk</u> Alice can sign m with $\sigma = \text{Sign}_{sk}(m)$
- If Bob verifies $\operatorname{Verif}_{vk}(m,\sigma) = 1$ he can be sure Alice signed m
- Security: Game Challer of Signi, Grach Def. Pr (A DV Min) Knest:) Win: (M, 6): L Ver(M, 6) 5 1 Win: (M, 6): L Ver(M, 6) 5 1

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One possible idea based on TDPs (e.g. RSA)

- Signing key: "private key" (or the trapdoor)
- Verification key: "public key" (or the description of the permutation)
- To sign *m* publish $\sigma(m) \neq t$

 $\delta(t(n)) > n$

 $T(\sigma(m))$ sm

publit 65Th pointer.

- To verify (m, t) accept if and only if: $\pi(t) = m$
- Is it secure signature?

"Hash and sign" using ideal hash function

